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DevOps Engineer

Feb 2026 – present

Own the AWS infrastructure, delivery pipelines and edge security for a high-traffic consumer platform: Terraform across three environments, serverless workloads, WAF and bot protection, and safe production change.

  • AWS
  • Terraform
  • Lambda
  • API Gateway
  • AWS WAF
  • ElastiCache Redis
  • ECR
  • CloudFront
  • Route 53
  • CloudWatch
  • Kafka (MSK)
  • GitHub Actions
  • Python
requests an hour behind the WAF
~900k
requests an hour behind the WAF
environments, all in Terraform
3
environments, all in Terraform
fraud signal types tracked
11
fraud signal types tracked
stored AWS keys in CI
0
stored AWS keys in CI

AWS and Terraform

  • Wrote and maintain Terraform for integration, UAT and production, with isolated state per environment so a change in one never touches another.
  • Provisioned the full AWS stack for new backend services built by the development team: container-based Lambda, ElastiCache Redis with TLS and auth, Secrets Manager, security groups, CloudWatch and optional NAT egress switched on per environment. Existing VPCs are reused rather than duplicated.
  • Manage shared networking in the central infrastructure repo: internal load balancer target groups, host-based listener rules and private Route 53 records.
  • Brought hand-made WAF web ACLs and other console-built resources under Terraform by importing them, then made all new changes as code.
  • Consolidated container images from per-account ECR repos into a shared cross-account registry, with cross-account pull permissions for Lambda and a cutover with no downtime.
  • Found that an old integration VPC was effectively dead and moved workloads to the live one.

Serverless

  • Run Lambda workloads as container images on arm64 for lower cost per request.
  • Moved internal APIs off the public internet to private API Gateway endpoints, locked down with resource policies.
  • Fixed Lambda rejecting multi-arch image manifests in the build, and added smoke tests to every deploy.
  • Connected serverless workloads to a managed Kafka cluster over VPC peering or NAT egress, depending on the environment.

Scaling and reliability

  • Run Redis Multi-AZ in UAT so failover behaviour is tested before production.
  • Keep UAT in step with production, so infrastructure and WAF changes are proven on real-shaped traffic before they ship.
  • Protect the platform under load with WAF rate limiting on the most-hit flows (login, activation, account recovery), tuned from real traffic so spikes and abuse are absorbed at the edge instead of reaching the backend.
  • Every production change follows the same routine: backups, reviewed dry-run diffs, lock-token and expected-state checks so nobody's console edits get overwritten, and before/after traffic comparisons.

Security and WAF

  • Own AWS WAF for the platform's APIs and for several Amplify-hosted frontends behind CloudFront.
  • Rolled out AWS managed rule sets for IP reputation, common exploits and known bad inputs, Bot Control on the most-abused login endpoint, and Account Takeover Protection on a separate portal's login.
  • New rules go live in count mode first, then get tuned and switched to block, so no legitimate users are locked out.
  • Restricted admin paths to the corporate VPN with host-header and query-string rules.
  • Audited the live WAF against code and found unmanaged console changes and rules that existed nowhere in code.
  • Found and fixed a case-sensitivity mismatch that meant a fraud rule had never matched half its URLs, and rules sharing a CloudWatch metric name that made their numbers impossible to tell apart.
  • Reviewed findings from an external security assessment, separating real gaps from ones already covered by a layer the assessors couldn't see.

CI/CD

  • GitHub Actions pipelines that build images, push them to the central ECR, deploy and run smoke tests.
  • Keyless pipeline auth through GitHub OIDC roles, with no long-lived AWS credentials stored anywhere.

Observability and fraud detection

  • WAF logging, CloudWatch alarms and dashboards, including log-based dashboards where metrics weren't available.
  • Built a Python tool that pulls 11 fraud signal types from application and WAF logs, including credential-stuffing patterns, suspicious IPs, activation velocity, card verification failures and device fingerprint spread.
  • Showed that the 10k-row cap in CloudWatch Logs Insights meant some queries could silently miss results, and proposed fixes: pagination, tighter filters and input from the data and fraud teams.

Cost

  • Moved Bot Control to the end of the rule order and scoped it to specific endpoints, so the paid inspection runs on far less traffic.
  • Flagged WAF log volume (about 2.8 TB stored) as a cost item, and weigh query cost and time in all log tooling.

Documentation

  • Handover docs for every service I stand up: environments, images, deploys, Terraform, routing, logs and access.
  • Evidence write-ups for every production change: before/after configs, test results and rollback steps.